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Abstract
In this paper, we develop BlockMarkchain, as a secure data market place, where individual data sellers
can exchange certified data with buyers, in a secure environment, without any mutual trust among the
parties, and without trusting on a third party, as a mediator. To develop this platform, we rely on a smart
contract, deployed on a secure public blockchain. The main challenges here are to verify the validity of
data and to prevent malicious behavior of the parties, while preserving the privacy of the data and taking
into account the limited computing and storage resources available on the blockchain. In BlockMarkchain,
the buyer has the option to dispute the honesty of the seller and prove the invalidity of the data to the
smart contract. The smart contract evaluates the buyer’s claim and punishes the dishonest party by
forfeiting his/her deposit in favor of the honest party. BlockMarkchain enjoys several salient features
including (i) the certified data has never been revealed on the public blockchain, (ii) the size of data
posted on the blockchain, the load of computation on the blockchain, and the cost of communication with
the blockchain is constant and negligible, and (iii) the computation cost of verifications on the parties is
not expensive.
1 Introduction
These days, having access to the massive datasets on a subject becomes one of the key elements for a research
or business initiative to be successful. Large companies are willing to spend a considerable amount of money
to collect and process data. This motivates some organizations to develop their business as mediators for
collecting and selling data to others. Still, a major amount of valuable and expensive data is lost or remained
unused. For example, every day thousands of medical records, in the form of reports of medical diagnosis,
treatments, test results, MRI, and X-Ray images are generated, with considerable cost, and then lost or
forgotten after treatment. Those records, if collected, can significantly facilitate and accelerate medical and
pharmaceutical research and treatment.
One major reason that those data remained unused is that there is no easy-to-use popular and secure
platform, as a data market place, that allows individuals to present and sell their data directly, and assures
them that they will benefit from that.
In literature, developing such a platform is known as fair exchange problem [1]. It has been shown that
there is no solution for the fair exchange problem without any trusted third party [2]. We need a third party as
a mediator between the data sellers and the buyers, to enforce the parties to fulfill their commitments, prevent
malicious behavior, evaluate the validity of data, and manage disputes. The challenge is that the mediator
can exploit the situation, and ask for unreasonable commission fees. He/She may lie about the real values
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Figure 1: Problem Statement
of data, sell the data without the owners awareness and permission, or abuse the data for some unintended
purposes. FacebookCambridge Analytica data scandal is only one example of those misbehaviors [3].
Recently, it has been shown that a smart contract, deployed on a public blockchain, can be used as the
third party. Since smart contract on a blockchain is transparent, immutable, and verifiable, it does not have
many disadvantages of regular mediators, such as deviating from the protocol and dishonesty. Of course,
transparency can be a disadvantage too, because it may violate data privacy. This motivates [4] using zero-
knowledge proofs [5], in order to be able to publicly verify the honesty of the parties without revealing the
data itself. However, using zero-knowledge proofs cause a huge computation burden on the parties. In this
paper, our objective is to develop a blockchain-oriented solution for a data market place, with minimum
communication, computational, and storage overhead on the blockchain and the parties.
We focus on a scenario, where a data seller, named Alice, owns some data, denoted by DT , which is stored
on a data storage (see Figure 1a). The data, when generated, is certified by Carol, as a trusted individual
(e.g., a medical doctor). In particular, hash(DT ), for some cryptographic hash function hash, has been signed
by Carol and posted on the blockchain (we will explain these steps in details in Section 3). Signing the data
by an authenticated party, Carol, prevents generating fake data. It also specifies the possession of data by
its true owner, Alice. The data buyer, Bob, wants to buy this data, through a smart contract, deployed on
the blockchain.
The proposed platform must resolve the following challenges (see Figure 1b)
1. No Trusted Environment: In the trading process, we cannot presume the seller Alice or the buyer
Bob is trusted. We only assume the data authenticator Carol is trusted, and she verifies validity of
data DT before signing hash(DT ) and posting it on the blockchain. Let’s explicate Alice and Bob’s
dishonesty:
(a) Resistance to Alice’s dishonesty: If Alice does not send valid data DT to Bob, no money
should be transfered from Bob to Alice and Alice must be punished for her dishonesty.
(b) Resistance to Bob’s dishonesty: If Bob receives the valid data, he must not be able to deny
its veracity and the agreed price must be paid to Alice. In other words, Bob must not be able to
refrain the payment after receiving the valid data.
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2. Privacy: No part of the data should be revealed to anyone other than Bob. In other words, in the
process of trading data, no part of the data should be uploaded to the blockchain. Even if Bob has a
valid dispute, no part of valid data is revealed. Of course, this does not include the case where Alice
reveals the data to the public, or the case where Bob does so after paying for it.
3. Low resource over-head on Blockchain: With current technologies, storage and computation on
the blockchain is very expensive. For a blockchain-oriented platform to work in the real world, we need
to be very cautious about the computational, storage, and communication overhead that the platform
imposes on the blockchain.
In [6], posted on Github on June 20, 2018, we propose a first version of our solution, named Blockchain-
based Data Market, where we avoid any computationally-heavy cryptographic solutions such as zero-knowledge
proofs. This platform is such that not only computation cost on parties is not expensive, but also compu-
tation and storage cost on the smart contract is small. In more detail, in the primary version when parties
behave according to the protocol, the needed computation and storage cost to run the smart contract is con-
stant and negligible. On the other hand, when a party deviates from the protocol and behaves dishonestly,
the cost of disputation proof on the smart contract is in the order of O(log(N)) where N denotes the size
of the primary data. More recently FairSwap [7] (improved in [8]) also proposes a scheme to solve the fair
exchange problem. In their platform also the data size in a disputation on the smart contract is in order of
O(log(N)). However, the proposed scheme [6] the data transferred off-chain has a smaller size than FairSwap.
In this paper, we present the modified version of Blockchain-based Data Market, BlockMarkchain, where we
further reduce the computation and storage cost of disputation on the smart contract from O(log(N)) to a
constant O(1).
Alternative approaches, base on game theory, have been proposed in [9, 10]. In those solutions, each
party at first commits a deposit on the smart contract. If one of the parties behave maliciously, both parties
will be punished and lose their deposit. This motivates the parties to behave honestly in trade. In the
schemes of [9, 10], the malicious party is not detected, and thus those schemes do not work if one party is
willing to harm the other, at the cost of damaging itself. On the contrary, in BlockMarkchain, the platform
detects the wrongdoer and only punishes him/her.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will review the concepts of blockchain
and smart contracts. In Section 3, we describe problem setting. In Section 4, we introduce BlockMarkchain
platform. In Sections 5 and 6, we further improve the proposed solution in terms of the size of uploaded
data and computation on the blockchain. In Section 7, we conclude.
Notations: hash denotes a cryptographic hash function, which is collision, preimage, and second-
preimage resistant (see [11] for the definitions). SignA[X] is equal to the sign of X by A signature. Enck(X)
and Deck(X) denote the encrypt and decrypt version of X by key k using a secure cryptography function so
Deck(Enck(X)) = X. For a function g and a number X, C(g(X)) ∈ R+ denotes computational complexity
of calculating g(X). X denotes a version of X that one claims that it is equal to X. X||Y denotes the
concatenation of X and Y . For M ∈ N, [M ] = {1, . . . ,M}.
2 Background
In this section, we review blockchains and smart contracts, as the fundamental decentralized tools we use to
develop our data market.
2.1 Blockchain
In 2008, Bitcoin was presented as a peer-to-peer decentralized cash network [12]. Unlike conventional banking
networks, which is based on a trusted entity (e.g., a bank) to maintain the ledger, Bitcoin network relies
on some volunteers, called miners, to develop a public ledger of validated transactions with authenticated
signatures, and to prevent fraud and double-spending. The public ledger is formed as an ordered sequence
of blocks, named as blockchain, where each block contains some transactions. Every miner has a copy of the
blockchain. Miners compete to generate a new block to be added to the blockchain. Every 10 minutes on
average, a new block, generated by one of the miners, will be the winner, and is broadcasted to the network.
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Every other miner receives this block and inspects it. If it is valid, the miner will add it to the current
blockchain; otherwise, it will be discarded. The competition is based on proof of work. In this strategy, each
miner needs to solve a hash-based puzzle. In this puzzle, each miner needs to change a nonce field in the
header of the block such that the hash of the header has a specific property. The miner who generates a
block with a list of valid transactions, and finds the nonce faster than the others is the winner. A block
reward and some transaction fees, in a cryptocurrency called Bitcoin, have been allotted to the winner. This
reward can be spent in the subsequent blocks.
In this process, all miners have a copy of the blockchain, where blocks in those copies become eventually
consistent. It is shown that unless a major fraction of the processing power in the network is controlled by
an adversary, the network is secure.
The fact that we can have a decentralized trusted network, without a central management, that can
maintain a database is considered as a revolutionary achievement. Central management is prone to cor-
ruption, abuse of information, intimidation, etc. Blockchain technology leads to new platforms for different
applications where the role of central management is replaced by an immutable and transparent blockchain.
2.2 Smart Contract
Blockchain technology enables another important capability, called smart contract. A smart contract is a
computer program that is deployed on the blockchain. A user can interact with this program by issuing a
transaction to the address of the smart contract. When such a transaction is received by a miner, it will run
the smart contract with the transaction as the input and updates the account of that smart contract as the
output.
Since smart contracts are deployed on the blockchain, it is transparent and immutable, anyone can read
every single line of the code, observe and verify the inputs and outputs. This will expand the application
of blockchain to a wide variety the cases, and allows us to develop alternative solutions for the scenarios
which have been designed and managed in a central manner. Bitcoin, in the form of the locking script in the
transactions, allows implementing smart contracts. However, it scripting language is not Turing complete,
and thus its scope of applications is limited [13]. The constraints of writing the code in Bitcoin protocol
motivate developers to build protocols in which more sophisticated smart contracts can be implemented. In
2013, Ethereum protocol [14] was created as a convenient platform to compose smart contracts. For example,
Stroj smart contract [15] is implemented to develop a decentralized storage platform on Ethereum.
Recall that the result of running a smart contract for input is verified by all miners. To do so, all miners
will run the smart contract by themselves. As a result, we have to keep the computation complexity of the
smart contract to be very limited. This will be controlled by the cost that miners will ask to run the smart
contract.
3 Data Market: Problem Description
In this section, we describe the problem statement, the requirements, and also the trust model for the data
market.
3.1 Problem Statement
We consider a scenario, where Alice owns some data, denoted by DT , and intents to transfer it to Bob as a
person who wants to buy the data for a price, which has been agreed upon, denoted by CTarget. All parties
have access to a public and transparent blockchain, and a smart contract deployed on it to facilitate the
exchange. Data DT is certified by Carol, who is a trusted person. For example, Carol can be a doctor, who
witnesses the generation of the data. To certify the data, Carol signs hash(DT ), and posts it and hash(DT )
on the blockchain, in an interaction with the smart contract. Beyond that, Carol will not keep any record
of the data and will not intervene in the process of trading the data.
We also assume Alice and Bob deposit some values denoted by CdepositA and CdepositB respectively, on
the smart contract. If Alice is dishonest in the process of exchange, and sends incorrect data to Bob, the
smart contract should transfer CdepositA to Bob. Similarly if Bob is dishonest, and disputes the validity of the
data, after receiving the genuine data, the smart contract should transfer CdepositB to Alice. The problem
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here is how to design the steps of the trade process and the smart contract such that all of the requirements
listed in the next subsection are fulfilled.
3.2 Requirements
Assume in the end of the process, Bob receives DT as target data DT from Alice. We need, the following
conditions to be satisfied:
1. No need to trust a third party in the trade process: The platform should be such that it does
not need any middle party (other than the smart contract) to moderate the trade process.
2. Presence of the certified person, Carol, is not required during the trade process: The
platform should be such that only at the time that a record of Alice is issued, the certified person
needs to be available to sign the hash of the data and place it and hash(DT ) on the blockchain. Recall
that Carol is assumed to be honest and thus her signature on hash of the record in this platform
means that the data with hash(DT ) is genuine. Carol does not keep any record of the data, and is not
available later to interact with.
3. Alice’s dishonesty can be proved and punished: If DT is not equal to DT , Bob must be able to
dispute the trade and prove Alice’s dishonesty. In that case Alice must not receive CTarget and Bob
must also receive CdepositA from Alice.
4. Bob’s dishonesty can be proved and punished: If DT is equal to DT , then Alice must receive
CTarget. In this case, if Bob is dishonest, and disputes the validity of the data, the smart contract
should be able to prove Bob’s dishonestly and send CdepositB , in addition to CTarget, to Alice.
5. If the network is disconnected, before DT is revealed to Bob, none of the parties suffers
any loss: Let us assume that before DT is revealed to Bob, the network stops working. In this case,
the situation should be as if the trade did not start at all. It means that Alice does not have access to
CTarget, Bob does not receive data DT , CdepositA is refundable to Alice, and CdepositB and CTarget to
Bob.
6. No need for the parties to do extensive computation: The platform should be such that parties
in a trade (Alice and Bob) don’t need to execute large computations.
7. No need to place bulk of data on the blockchain: We know that uploading data to a public
blockchain costs a lot. For example, the cost of uploading 1MB data in Ethereum blockchain is about
$600 based on the current price of Ether on 22 August 2019 [16, 17]. The platform should be designed
such that it does not store bulky data on the blockchain.
8. No need to execute extensive computation on the blockchain: As we know, all computations
on a smart contract must be verified by all miners thus it costs too much if these computations are
extensive. Miners may refuse to mine and verify such transactions.
9. Privacy of the data must be preserved: The platform should be such that during the trade
process, the data is not revealed to the network.
3.3 The Trust Model
In this problem, we consider the following trust model under which we design and improve the proposed
platform:
1. We assume that Alice and Bob are not trusted and may act maliciously.
2. We assume that Carol is trusted. If hash(DT ) is matched with hash(DT ), which has been signed and
posted by Carol on blockchain, then DT is genuine.
3. The public blockchain is secure, transparent, and immutable. The smart contract, its input, and its
state (or its account), is transparent to everyone.
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4 The Data Market Platform
In previous section, we described the problem formulation and requirements. In Subsection 4.1, we present
BlockMarkchain platform. In Subsection 4.2, we prove how the proposed platform satisfies the required
conditions stated in the problem. In Sections 5 and 6, we further improve the proposed algorithm in terms
of disclosure of the data and the cost of storage and computation on the blockchain respectively from O(N)
to O(log(N)) and from O(log(N)) to O(1).
4.1 Platform Presentation
In this section, we present the proposed scheme which includes two phases (Figure 2).
4.1.1 Trading Phase
In this phase, Alice and Bob follows Algorithm 4.1 to interact with each other through a smart contract to
exchange DT .
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Algorithm 4.1 O(N)-Algorithm: Trading Phase
1: procedure Initialization
2: Alice owns data DT , which is certified by Carol. This means Carol has signed hash(DT ) as
SignCarol[hash(DT )] and posted hash(DT ) and SignCarol[hash(DT )] on the smart contract.
3: Alice and Bob agree upon price CTarget, and also CdepositA and CdepositB .
4: Alice generates a key, denoted by k.
5: end procedure
6: procedure Trading Phase
7: Bob sends hash(DT ) to the smart contract, showing he has interest in buying DT .
8: Bob deposits CTarget and CdepositB to the smart contract, nonrefundable for one day.
9: Alice deposits CdepositA to the smart contract, nonrefundable for one day.
. If Algorithm doesn’t get to Step 13 until the end of one day, it will go to Step 21.
10: Alice generates Enck(DT ) as an encrypted version of DT , using key k, where DT is the data that
she claims to be equal to DT . Alice sends Enck(DT ) to Bob using an off-chain channel (a custom P2P
channel).
11: Alice commits hash(Enck(DT )) to the smart contract, claiming it is indeed hash of Enck(DT ) .
12: Bob checks if hash(Enck(DT )), posted on the smart contract is indeed equal to hash of Enck(DT ), then
sends ”Yes” to the smart contract if the equality is verified. In other words, Bob checks this equality:
hash(Enck(DT )) == hash(Enck(DT ))
If Bob sends ”No” to the smart contract or remains silent until the end of one day, the smart contract
goes to Step 21.
13: After receiving ”Yes” by the smart contract from Bob, Alice sends k to the smart contract, claiming
it is indeed key k.
14: Bob can check the validity of the received data in Step 10 by decrypting it using key k (available
on the smart contract), then computing the hash of the decrypted data, and then comparing it with
hash(DT ). In other words, he can check the following equality:
hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DT )
))
== hash
(
DT
)
If the equality is not verified by Bob, he sends Enck(DT ) to the smart contract. Otherwise, he does not
send anything to the smart contract.
15: if the smart contract receives no objection from Bob in a determined grace period (say 2 days) then
16: CTarget is refundable to Alice, and CdepositA and CdepositB to Alice and Bob respectively.
17: Algorithm terminates.
18: else
19: Go to Disputation Phase (Algorithm 4.2).
20: end if
21: Deposits be refundable.
CTarget and CdepositB are refundable to Bob and CdepositA to Alice. Algorithm terminates.
22: end procedure
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4.1.2 Disputation Phase
Algorithm 4.2 O(N)-Algorithm: Disputation Phase
1: procedure Disputation Phase
2: Bob sends Enck(DT ) to the smart contract, claiming he received it from Alice in Step 10 of Algo-
rithm 4.1.
. Recall that Bob received Enck(DT ) from Alice in Step 10 of Algorithm 4.1.
3: Smart contract computes hash(Enck(DT )) and compares it with hash(Enck(DT )), received in Step 11
of Algorithm 4.1, from Alice.
4: if hash(Enck(DT )) == hash(Enck(DT )) then
5: Using key k, the smart contract calculates Deck(Enck(DT )) as decryption of Enck(DT ), and then
computes hash(Deck(Enck(DT ))).
. Recall that the smart contract received hash(Enck(DT )) and k from Alice in Steps 11 and 13 of
Algorithm 4.1.
6: if hash(Deck(Enck(DT ))) == hash(DT ) then
7: go to Step 15: Bob is dishonest.
8: else
9: go to Step 14: Alice is dishonest.
10: end if
11: else
12: go to Step 15: Bob is dishonest.
13: end if
14: Alice is dishonest.
CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB are refundable to Bob. Algorithm terminates.
15: Bob is dishonest.
CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB are refundable to Alice. Algorithm terminates.
16: end procedure
4.2 Addressing the Requirements
Now, we will explain how the proposed algorithm addresses the challenges listed in Subsection 3.2:
1. No need to trust a third party in the trade process: By carefully reviewing the proposed
platform, it is obvious that does not need any middle man since the smart contract takes care of the
integrity of the trade between Alice and Bob.
2. No need to presence of the certified person, Carol, during the trade process: The proposed
algorithm does not need any attendance of the certified person during the trade process.
3. Overcoming Alice’s dishonesty: If Alice sends another data instead of DT to Bob, according to
Step 2 of Algorithm 4.2, Bob will send the encrypted version of DT (Enck(DT )) to the smart contract.
The smart contract already has key k and can investigate and confirm that Alice took a fraudulent
step (see Steps 6-10 of Algorithm 4.2). So, in Step 14 of Algorithm 4.2, the smart contract gives all
money (CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB) to Bob as a penalty. Note that CdepositA must cover the cost
of the data uploading to the blockchain by Bob in the case that disputation happens.
4. Overcoming Bob’s dishonesty: Bob’s dishonesty means that he has received DT , but he disputes
to take all deposits (CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB) by uploading another data instead of the data
which has received off-chain. But, such a fraud can be detected. Recall that Bob, in Step 12 of
Algorithm 4.1, already has confirmed that the hash of received encrypted data is equal to the claimed
hash on the smart contract in Step 11 of Algorithm 4.1,
(
i.e., hash(Enck(DT )) = hash(Enck(DT ))
)
.
Therefore if he claims that some other data has been received through the off-chain channel, according
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to the second-preimage resistancy of the hash function, his data does not have the same hash value
as hash(Enck(DT )) to pass the condition of Step 4 of Algorithm 4.2. If Bob still claims this, then the
smart contract will send his deposit (CdepositB), in addition to CTarget, to Alice.
5. If the network is disconnected, before DT is revealed to Bob, none of the parties suffers
any loss: After sending key k to the smart contract (in Step 13 of Algorithm 4.1), DT is revealed to
Bob, hence if the network is disconnected before it, the smart contract sends CdepositA to Alice, and
CdepositB and CTarget to Bob (in Step 21 of Algorithm 4.1).
6. No need for the parties to do extensive computation: According to Algorithm 4.1, the compu-
tational overhead on Alice is computing the encryption of DT and the hash of Enck(DT ) (in Steps 10
and 11), and on Bob is computing the hash of Enck(DT ), the decryption of Enck(DT ), and the
hash of Deck(Enck(DT )) (in Steps 12 and 14). Let us assume that for any data D,
|Enck(D)|
|D| = α,
C(Enck(D))
|D| = β1,
C(Deck(D))
|D| = β2, and
C(hash(D))
|D| = β3, for some α ≥ 1 and β1, β2, and β3 > 0. Then
the computational overhead on the parties is O(N), where N = |DT |.
7. No need to place bulk of data on the blockchain: Reviewing Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2, one can
see that if the disputation phase does not happen, then the size of the data uploaded to the blockchain
is constant and negligible. On the other hand, if disputation happens, according to Algorithm 4.2,
Bob needs to upload the encrypted data that he received through the off-chain channel, to the smart
contract. We know that the size of the encrypted version of the data is proportional to the size of the
data, which is large, in the order of the size of the data i.e., N . In the next sections, we will modify
the proposed algorithm and resolve this issue.
8. No need to execute extensive computation on the blockchain: Again, one can confirm that in
Algorithm 4.1, the computation cost of the smart contract is very limited. However, if the disputation
phase is called, then calculating hash(Enck(DT )) and hash(Deck(Enck(DT ))) in Steps 4 and 6 of Algo-
rithm 4.2 require O(N) computation, which is not desired. We will resolve this issue in the modified
algorithm in the next sections.
9. Privacy of the data must be preserved: We can confirm that the proposed algorithm addresses
the privacy challenges by considering two different scenarios:
(a) If the disputation does not happen, the final data is revealed only to Bob and never to the
blockchain. Thus, it is not publicly available and the privacy of the data is preserved.
(b) The disputation happens because Alice has sent a wrong data to Bob. In that case, Bob initiates
the disputation phase and in that phase DT will be revealed. However, DT is not the same as
DT and thus revealing it does not violate privacy.
There is a concern here. In the case of disputation, if Algorithm 4.2 happens, even if DT and DT are
different in a bit, and then DT will be revealed entirely. We will resolve this issue in the modified
algorithms in the next sections.
5 Platform Improvement: O(log(N))-Algorithm:
In this modified version of the algorithm, Carol uses Merkle Tree [18] of data DT , in a certain way, described
in Algorithm 5.1, and commits the hash of the root and the signed version of it to the smart contract (see
Figure 3a). This approach will reduce the size of the data, uploaded to the smart contract in the disputation
phase, and maximum computation load of the smart contract from O(N) to O(log(N)), as detailed in
Algorithm 5.1 (Figure 3).
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Algorithm 5.1 O(log(N))-Algorithm: Trading Phase
1: procedure Initialization
2: Alice owns data DT , which is divided into M ∈ N chunks, each of size L ∈ N bits,
as DT = (D
1
T , . . . , D
M
T ). Data DT is certified by Carol. This means Carol has uploaded
MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )) and SignCarol
[
MerkleRoot
(
hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )
)]
to the smart
contract (see Figure 3a).
3: Alice and Bob agree upon price CTarget, and also CdepositA and CdepositB .
4: Alice generates a key, denoted by k.
5: end procedure
6: procedure Trading Phase
7: Bob sends MerkleRoot
(
hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )
)
to the smart contract, showing his interest in buying
DT .
8: Bob deposits CTarget and CdepositB to the smart contract, nonrefundable for one day.
9: Alice deposits CdepositA to the smart contract, nonrefundable for one day.
. If Algorithm doesn’t get to Step 13 until the end of one day, it will go to Step 21.
10: Alice generates Enck(DmT ),∀m ∈ [M ], as an encrypted version of DmT , using key k, where DmT is the
mth chunk of data DT (Similar to Algorithm 4.1, DT is the data that Alice sends and claims to be DT ).
Alice sends Dataoffchain ,
(
hash(D1T ),Enck(D
1
T ), hash(D
2
T ),Enck(D
2
T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T ),Enck(D
M
T )
)
to Bob
through the off-chain channel.
11: Alice commits MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain) to the smart contract, claiming it is equal to MerkleRoot of
Dataoffchain (Figure 3b).
12: Bob checks if:
a MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain) == MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain)
b MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )) == MerkleRoot(hash(D
1
T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T ))
and sends ”Yes” to the smart contract, if the above equalities hold. If Bob sends ”No” to the smart
contract or remains silent until the end of one day, the smart contract goes to Step 21.
13: After receiving ”Yes” by the smart contract from Bob, Alice sends k to the smart contract, claiming
it is indeed key k.
14: Bob can check validity of the received data by decrypting each encrypted chunk using key k (available
on the smart contract), then computing the hash of each decrypted chunk, and then comparing each
with the version that Alice sent to him through the off-chain channel. In other words, he can check the
following equality for all chunks:
hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DmT )
))
== hash
(
DmT
)
,m ∈ [M ]
If the above equality is not valid for at least one chunk, say chunk w ∈ [M ], Bob sends
hash(DwT )||Enck(DwT ), and its Merkle proof for MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain) to the smart contract. Other-
wise, he does not send anything to the smart contract.
15: if the smart contract receives no objection from Bob in a determined grace period (say 2 days) then
16: CTarget is refundable to Alice, and CdepositA and CdepositB to Alice and Bob respectively.
17: The algorithm terminates.
18: else
19: Go to the Disputation Phase (Algorithm 5.2).
20: end if
21: Deposits be refundable.
CTarget and CdepositB are refundable to Bob and CdepositA to Alice. Algorithm terminates.
22: end procedure
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(a) Data DT is split into M ∈ N chunks (say M = 4), as DT = (D1T , . . . , DMT ).
Carol uploads MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )) and SignCarol
[
MerkleRoot
(
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M
T )
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to the
smart contract.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MerkleRoot (Data ) 
hash( ) Enc ( ) hash( ) 
 
hash( ) 
 
hash( ) 
 
Enc ( ) 
 
Enc ( ) 
 
Enc ( ) 
 
Data  
(b) Alice sends sequence Dataoffchain ,
(
hash(D1T ),Enck(D
1
T ), hash(D
2
T ),Enck(D
2
T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T ),Enck(D
M
T )
)
, in-
closed in the orange box in the figure, to Bob through the off-chain channel. Alice also commits MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain)
to the smart contract, claiming it is equal to MerkleRoot of Dataoffchain.
If Bob disputes the validity of a chunk of data (say 3rd chunk), represented by red rectangle, he sends
hash(D3T )||Enck(D3T ) and its Merkle proof (shown by blue rectangles) to the smart contract.
Figure 3: Merkle Tree for O(log(N))-Algorithm
Algorithm 5.2 O(log(N))-Algorithm: Disputation Phase
1: procedure Disputation Phase
2: If there is a chunk w ∈ [M ], such that hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
)) 6= hash(DwT ), Bob sends its hash and
encrypted version, i.e., hash(DwT )||Enck(DwT ), along with its Merkle proof for MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain) to
the smart contract, claiming he received it from Alice in Step 10 of Algorithm 5.1. We denote these data
as Proofoffchain.
. Recall that Bob received Dataoffchain from Alice in Step 10 of Algorithm 5.1.
3: Using the uploaded data by Bob, the smart contract verifies Proofoffchain for MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain),
received in Step 11 of Algorithm 5.1.
4: if Proofoffchain is verified for MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain) then
5: Using key k, the smart contract calculates Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
)
as decryption of Enck(DwT ), and then
computes hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
))
.
. Recall that the smart contract received MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain) and k from Alice in Steps 11
and 13 of Algorithm 5.1.
6: if hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
))
== hash(DwT ) then
7: go to Step 15: Bob is dishonest.
8: else
9: go to Step 14: Alice is dishonest.
10: end if
11: else
12: go to Step 15: Bob is dishonest.
13: end if
14: Alice is dishonest.
CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB are refundable to Bob. Algorithm terminates.
15: Bob is dishonest.
CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB are refundable to Alice. Algorithm terminates.
16: end procedure
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5.1 Analysis of O(log(N))-Algorithm
It is easy to verify that the first to fifth requirements are satisfied in this algorithm. Also, it is easy to see
that the computation and storage cost of the trading phase to the smart contract is constant. Here we want
to evaluate the computation load for the parties and the computation and storage cost of the disputation
phase to the smart contract.
5.1.1 Computation Load for the Parties
According to Algorithm 5.1, the computation load for Alice is computing the encryption of each chunk of
the data and MerkleRoot of Dataoffchain (Steps 10 and 11), and for Bob is computing MerkleRoot(Dataoffchain),
MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )), and hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DmT )
))
,∀m ∈ [M ] (Steps 12 and 14). Similar
to the analysis of the previous algorithm, the computation load for the parties is O(N), where |DT | = N .
5.1.2 Size of the Data Uploaded to the Blockchain
As we argued, in Algorithm 4.1, in the disputation phase, the size of the data uploaded to the smart contract
is O(N). Here we argue that in modified Algorithm 5.1 and 5.2, this is reduced to O(log(N)).
Let us assume |DT | = N , and thus the number of chunks is equal to M = dNL e. In addition, let us assume
that for any data D, |Enck(D)||D| = α, for some α ≥ 1. Then the size of Proofoffchain, the uploaded data to the
smart contract, in this scheme is equal to:
(log2M + 1)h+ αL = (log2(
N
L
) + 1)h+ αL
where h denotes the size of the hash output. The optimum size of L to minimize the uploaded cost is equal
to:
L∗ =
h
α ln(2)
.
For example for α = 1 and h = 256, the optimal chunk size is equal to 369 bits. Therefore, the order of data
that must be uploaded to the blockchain for the disputation phase is reduced from O(N) to O(log(N)).
5.1.3 Computation Load of the Smart Contract
Moreover, the computation load of the smart contract in the disputation phase is also reduced to O(log(N)).
The reason is that the smart contract verifies a Merkle proof, in Step 4 of Algorithm 5.2, with O(log(N))
computation load and computes the hash of the decryption of an encrypted chunk of the data, in Step 6 of
Algorithm 5.2, with O(1) computation load.
5.1.4 Privacy of The Data
Similar to the previous algorithm, here also the privacy of the data is perfectly guaranteed. However, in
addition to that, in the disputation phase, at most one chunk of DT is revealed.
6 Platform Improvement: O(1)-Algorithm
Recall that in the disputation phase of both O(N)-Algorithm and O(log(N))-Algorithm, Bob needs to prove
that the data that he sends to the smart contract, in the disputation phase, is the same as what he has
received from Alice through the off-chain channel. This proof requires upload cost of, respectively, O(N)
and O(log(N)) in O(N)-Algorithm and O(log(N))-Algorithm. In this section, we propose an alternative
approach to reduce this cost O(1) using Alice’s signature. In this approach, Alice sends to Bob, the hash
of each chunk of the data, the encrypted version of each chunk, along with her signature of those contents,
through the off-chain channel. Since the public key of Alice is already available on the smart contract, in
case that Bob wants to dispute the validity of one chunk, he can very easily prove that he received that
chunk from Alice, as detailed in Algorithm 6.1 (Figure 4).
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Algorithm 6.1 O(1)-Algorithm: Trading Phase
1: procedure Initialization
2: Alice owns data DT , which is divided into M ∈ N chunks, each of size L ∈ N bits,
as DT = (D
1
T , . . . , D
M
T ). Data DT is certified by Carol. This means Carol has uploaded
MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )) and SignCarol
[
MerkleRoot
(
hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )
)]
to the smart
contract (see Figure 3a).
3: Alice and Bob agree upon price CTarget, and also CdepositA and CdepositB .
4: Alice generates a key, denoted by k.
5: end procedure
6: procedure Trading Phase
7: Bob sends MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )) to the smart contract, showing his interest in buying
DT .
8: Bob deposits CTarget and CdepositB to the smart contract, nonrefundable for one day.
9: Alice deposits CdepositA to the smart contract, nonrefundable for one day.
. If Algorithm doesn’t get to Step 12 until the end of one day, it will go to Step 20.
10: Alice generates Enck(DmT ),∀m ∈ [M ], as an encrypted version of DmT , using key k, where DmT is
the mth chunk of data DT . Alice sends hash(DmT )||Enck(DmT ), ∀m ∈ [M ], to Bob through the off-chain
channel. Moreover, she sends the signed of hash of their concatenation using her private key (the one
paired with her public key on the blockchain), SignAlice
[
hash
(
hash(DmT )||Enck(DmT )
)]
to Bob through
the off-chain channel.
11: Bob checks if:
a the signature of Alice in SignAlice
[
hash
(
hash(DmT )||Enck(DmT )
)]
is verified, using Alice public key
and hash(DmT )||Enck(DmT ), ∀m ∈ [M ].
b MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T )) == MerkleRoot(hash(D
1
T ), . . . , hash(D
M
T ))
and sends ”Yes” to the smart contract, if the above equalities hold. If Bob sends ”No” to the smart
contract or remains silent until the end of one day, the smart contract goes to Step 20.
12: After receiving ”Yes” by the smart contract from Bob, Alice sends k to the smart contract, claiming
it is indeed key k.
13: Bob can check validity of the received data by decrypting each encrypted chunk using key k (available
on the smart contract), then computing the hash of each decrypted chunk, and then comparing each with
the version that Alice sent to him through the P2P channel. In other words, he can check the following
equality for all chunks:
hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DmT )
))
== hash
(
DmT
)
,m ∈ [M ]
If the above equality is not valid for at least one chunk, say chunk w ∈ [M ], Bob sends
Enck(DwT )||hash(DwT ), and SignAlice
[
hash
(
hash(DwT )||Enck(DwT )
)]
to the smart contract. Otherwise, he
does not send anything to the smart contract.
14: if the smart contract receives no objection from Bob in a determined grace period (say 2 days) then
15: CTarget is refundable to Alice, and CdepositA and CdepositB to Alice and Bob respectively.
16: The algorithm terminates.
17: else
18: Go to Disputation Phase (Algorithm 6.2).
19: end if
20: Deposits be refundable.
CTarget and CdepositB are refundable to Bob and CdepositA to Alice. Algorithm terminates.
21: end procedure
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Figure 4: The messages transferred in O(1)-Algorithm
Algorithm 6.2 O(1)-Algorithm: Disputation Phase
1: procedure Disputation Phase
2: If there is a chunk w ∈ [M ], such that hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
)) 6= hash(DwT ), Bob sends its hash and
encrypted version, i.e., hash(DwT )||Enck(DwT ), along with SignAlice
[
hash
(
hash(DwT )||Enck(DwT )
)]
to the
smart contract, claiming he received it from Alice in Step 10 of Algorithm 6.1.
. Recall that Bob received these data from Alice in Step 10 of Algorithm 6.1.
3: Using the uploaded data by Bob, at first, the smart contract checks signature of data.
4: if Alice’s signature in SignAlice
[
hash
(
hash(DwT )||Enck(DwT )
)]
is verified using
hash
(
hash(DwT )||Enck(DwT )
)
then
5: Using key k, the smart contract calculates Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
)
as decryption of Enck(DwT ), and then
computes hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
))
.
. Recall that the smart contract received k from Alice in Step 12 of Algorithm 6.1.
6: if hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DwT )
))
== hash(DwT ) then
7: go to Step 15: Bob is dishonest.
8: else
9: go to Step 14: Alice is dishonest.
10: end if
11: else
12: go to Step 15: Bob is dishonest.
13: end if
14: Alice is dishonest.
CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB are refundable to Bob. Algorithm terminates.
15: Bob is dishonest.
CTarget, CdepositA, and CdepositB are refundable to Alice. Algorithm terminates.
16: end procedure
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6.1 Analysis of O(1)-Algorithm
It is easy to verify that the first to fifth requirements are satisfied in this algorithm. Also, it is easy to see
that the computation and storage cost of the trading phase to the smart contract is constant. Here we want
to evaluate the computation load for the parties and the computation and storage cost of the disputation
phase to the smart contract.
6.1.1 Computation Load for the Parties
According to Algorithm 6.1, the computation load for Alice is computing the encryption of each chunk of the
data and the signature of the hash of hash(DmT )||Enck(DmT ) (Step 10), and for Bob is computing verification
of the signature of Alice in the hash of hash(DmT )||Enck(DmT ), MerkleRoot(hash(D1T ), . . . , hash(DMT )), and
hash
(
Deck
(
Enck(DmT )
))
,∀m ∈ [M ] (Steps 11 and 13). Let us assume that for any data D, C(Sign(D))|D| = β4,
for some β4 > 0. Similar to the analysis of the previous algorithm, the computation load for the parties is
O(N), where |DT | = N .
6.1.2 Size of the Data Uploaded to the Blockchain
Note that the volume of the disputation data in this algorithm is constant, so by considering 65 bytes length
for the signature [19], h = 256, α = 1, and L = 256 the volume of the data needed for the disputation is 1032
bits. Therefore, the order of data that must be uploaded to the blockchain for the disputation is reduced to
O(1).
6.1.3 Computation Load of the Smart Contract
Also, the computation load of the smart contract in the disputation phase is also O(1), which is very desirable.
6.1.4 Privacy of The Data
In this approach also, in the disputation phase, only one chunk of DT is revealed.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, by exploiting the advantages of blockchain and smart contracts, we propose BlockMarkchain
platform as a decentralized data market that does not require any mutual trust between the trade parties
or a trusted third party as a mediator. In the proposed platform, the computation and storage load on
the smart contract is negligible and constant if the parties behave honestly. In the presence of malicious
behavior, the proposed algorithm allows the honest party to prove the malicious behavior of the other party
to the smart contract, again with O(1) computation and storage cost to the blockchain.
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